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In-work benefits are becoming an increasingly relevant labour market policy, gradually 
expanding in scope and geographical coverage. This paper investigates the equilibrium 
impact of in-work benefits and contrasts it with the traditional partial equilibrium analysis. We 
find under which conditions accounting for equilibrium wage adjustments amplifies the impact 
of in-work benefits on search intensity, participation, employment, and unemployment, 
compared to a framework in which wages are fixed. We also account for the financing of 
these benefits and determine the level of benefits necessary to achieve efficiency in a labour 
market characterized by search externalities. 
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In-work bene￿ts are becoming an increasingly relevant labour market policy.
A number of countries have recently introduced, or are about to introduce,
some type of bene￿t or tax credit conditioned on work (e.g. Australia, Bel-
gium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Korea, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Slovakia, and Sweden). Yet, other countries have
progressively extended the scope of existing programmes, which were originally
targeted at a very small section of the labour force. For instance, the Earned In-
come Tax Credit (EITC) in the US, which in 1975, the year of its introduction,
involved around six million families, is now the largest cash transfer programme
for low income families at the federal level. In 2003, about twenty million fam-
ilies received a total of $34 billion in bene￿ts from the EITC.1 Also the United
Kingdom has a more than 25-year history of in-work bene￿ts and has seen a
gradual increase in their scope.
The expansion of this type of programmes makes it increasingly relevant to
account for their equilibrium impact on the labour market. Moreover, since
the aim of introducing in-work bene￿ts is often to decrease unemployment and
increase labour force participation, it is particularly important to take invol-
untary unemployment, search e⁄ort, and participation into consideration when
studying the impact of in-work bene￿ts on labour market performance.
The aim of this paper is to study the equilibrium impact of in-work bene-
￿ts in a simple analytical framework displaying involuntary unemployment and
endogenous labour force participation. Using a search model of the Pissarides
type (Pissarides, 2000), we show that an in-work bene￿t reduces equilibrium
unemployment, moderates wages and boosts participation and search e⁄ort.
Total employment increases as a result. Moreover, in labour markets with an
ine¢ ciently high unemployment rate, the positive e⁄ects on employment and
labour force participation in equilibrium exceeds that in partial equilibrium.
This indicates that partial equilibrium studies that keep the wages ￿xed tend to
underestimate the bene￿cial e⁄ect of in-work bene￿ts. Moreover, it also indi-
1See Eissa and Hoynes (2005) and Committee on Ways and Means (2004).
1cates that countries that have run small scale experiments with in-work bene￿ts,
in which case the e⁄ect on the equilibrium wage is limited, can expect larger
e⁄ects if the scheme is introduced more generally. We include a proportional tax
on wages to account for the ￿nancing of the bene￿t. This is an important aspect
for a policy applying to a non negligible part of the workforce. We show that
an in-work bene￿t ￿nanced with a proportional income or payroll tax provides
the government with an instrument to reduce ine¢ ciencies induced by search
externalities. We derive the socially optimal level of in-work bene￿ts which fully
eliminates these ine¢ ciencies.
The analytical results are followed up with numerical simulations to quantify
the e⁄ects of IWB on labour market performance and derive the magnitude of
socially optimal in-work bene￿ts. The simulations show that accounting for
equilibrium wage adjustment is quantitatively important to assess the impact
of in-work bene￿ts on employment and unemployment and that the correction
of labour market distortions may warrant a level of bene￿ts that is relatively
high, but not far o⁄ from observed levels.
Considering in-work bene￿ts in an equilibrium setting reveals that their im-
pact on job creation is an important factor behind employment growth. Pre-
vious research has, on the other hand, almost exclusively been concerned with
the supply-side e⁄ects of in-work bene￿ts. On the empirical side, the evaluation
of programmes￿expansions in the US and the UK have shown that bene￿ts are
quite successful in terms of increasing labour supply and that it is the participa-
tion decision rather than the hour decision that is mostly a⁄ected by the EITC
(see for the US Eissa and Liebman,1996, Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001; for UK
see Brewer and Browne, 2006, and Blundell, 2006). On the theoretical side the
standard neoclassical labour supply model serves as the basis for predicting the
e⁄ects of the EITC on work hours (Meyer, 2002, Eissa and Hoynes, 2006) or
on the extensive (participation) margin (Saez, 2002). Also more policy oriented
work is characterized by a supply-side approach: in recent microsimulation stud-
ies looking at the impact of introducing in-work bene￿ts in European countries
(Immervoll et al., 2007, Bargain and Orsini, 2005), the crucial variable is the
elasticity of labour supply with respect to the net-of-tax wage rate.
Considering that an important aim of an EITC type of policy is to increase
2employment, which is an equilibrium outcome involving both supply-side and
demand-side factors, the limited number of studies that have accounted for
the demand side of the market might be surprising. However, some recent
empirical papers have raised the question of how the EITC is likely to a⁄ect
wages, and have tried to estimate the incidence of the EITC on wages in di⁄erent
ways. Leigh (2004) uses variations in US state EITCs to examine the e⁄ect of
the policy on pre-tax wages. The study by Rothstein (2007) uses the federal
expansion of the EITC in the mid-1990s to estimate the e⁄ects on wages of the
policy. Leigh (2004) ￿nds that wages are signi￿cantly reduced by the state EITC
and Rothstein (2007) ￿nds that women at the lower end of the skill distribution
face lower wages than they would have faced without the federal expansion of
the EITC.
Some recent model analyses of in-work bene￿ts incorporate unemployment.
Boone and Bovenberg (2004) stress the importance of in-work bene￿ts in order
to alleviate distortions in terms of an ine¢ ciently low search e⁄ort among the
unemployed. Boone and Bovenberg (2006) look at the optimal interaction be-
tween in-work bene￿ts and welfare bene￿ts and ￿nd a U-shaped relationship in
which in-work bene￿ts are aimed at poverty alleviation in countries with low
welfare bene￿ts (such as the US), while countries with generous social assistance
(such as many European ones) need in-work bene￿ts in order to maintain work-
ers in the labour force. Although these two studies account for unemployment
in their models, unemployment is exogenously imposed. Thus, when investi-
gating the impact of an in-work bene￿t, there will be no e⁄ect on wages and
unemployment as they are ￿xed by assumption.
A study that accounts for adjustments in wages while allowing for unem-
ployment to be endogenously determined is Lise et al (2005). They simulate
the general equilibrium e⁄ects of the Self Su¢ ciency Project (SSP) in Canada,
using a search framework to model the speci￿c institutional details. Their sim-
ulation results imply that accounting for equilibrium e⁄ects reduces, or actually
reverses, the impact of the policy. For instance, unemployment increases and
employment decreases following the introduction of SSP and the cost-bene￿t
analysis changes from a net gain from the programme to a net cost once the
equilibrium impact is accounted for. This is however due to the complex inter-
3actions between di⁄erent policy rules that characterize the Canadian system.
This rather limited previous literature on the impact of in-work bene￿t on
labour market performance is related to the more extensive literature on tax-
ation of labour within the context of imperfect labour markets. A number of
studies have investigated the impact of payroll and income taxes on wage for-
mation and unemployment in union bargaining models, e¢ ciency wage models,
and search and matching models. For example, Pissarides (1998) show that
payroll taxation in all these types of models will most likely have no impact on
unemployment as the tax is fully shifted over onto workers. Cardullo and Linden
(2007), however, show that employment subsidies to ￿rms employing low skilled
workers can increase employment. Also, increased progressiveness in the income
tax schedule has been shown to have a wage moderating, and thus an employ-
ment stimulating, e⁄ect in all these types of models (see Holmlund and Kolm,
1995, and Słrensen, 1999). In addition, socially optimal income tax schedules
has been studied within the context of imperfectly competitive labour markets.
The study by Boone and Bovenberg (2002) conducts a normative analysis of
the role of the tax system in alleviating labour-market imperfections and rais-
ing revenues. They derive the optimal income tax schedule within a static search
framework and ￿nd, as we do in section 5 for tax ￿nanced in-work bene￿ts, that
the proper choice of tax schedule can fully restore e¢ ciency created by search
externalities. In particular, they show that the optimal income tax schedule
is progressive with a marginal tax rate being equal to the one derived in this
paper.
The principal contribution of this paper is to shed light on the various chan-
nels through which an in-work bene￿t a⁄ects labour market outcomes in equilib-
rium, in a setting with involuntary unemployment. We underline the importance
of job creation, a channel that has been generally overlooked in the literature
on in-work bene￿ts. In particular, we show under which conditions account-
ing for equilibrium wage adjustment boosts the positive impact of bene￿ts on
labour market outcomes. Our results are derived both when ￿nancing of ben-
e￿ts is not accounted for and when bene￿ts are ￿nanced through proportional
taxation. Moreover, we quantify the magnitude of these e⁄ects through numer-
ical simulations. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the results are
4derived in a simple and stylized model in sections 2 and 3. In section 4, we con-
trast the analysis done in an equilibrium model of the labour market to partial
equilibrium analysis, where wages do not adjust. Section 5 considers the case
when the in-work bene￿t is ￿nanced with payroll taxes or proportional income
taxes. Numerical simulations are conducted in sections 6, and the last section
concludes.
2 The Model
The economy consists of a population that is ￿xed in size and, without loss of
generality, normalized to unity. The size of the labour force is endogenous. An
individual chooses to participate in the labour force if the return of participation
exceeds the return of non-participation. Individuals are heterogeneous with
respect to the value of leisure enjoyed when not participating. A worker who
participates in the labour force is either employed or searching for a job.
The economy is characterized by trading frictions due to the costly and time-
consuming matching of workers and ￿rms. The matching process of vacancies
and unemployed job searchers is captured by a concave and constant-returns-
to-scale matching function, X = h(v;su), where v is the vacancy rate and u is
the unemployment rate. The rates are de￿ned relative to the labour force. The
search intensity by an average worker is denoted by s.
The transition rate of the unemployed individual i into employment is given
by siX=su = si￿(￿), where ￿ = v=su denotes labour market tightness. Firms
￿ll vacancies at the rate X=v = q (￿). Higher labour market tightness ￿ increases
workers￿probability of ￿nding a job, but reduces the probability of a ￿rm ￿nding
a worker, i.e., ￿
0 (￿) > 0 and q0 (￿) < 0, where ￿ (￿) = ￿
q
0
q ￿ is the elasticity of
the expected duration of a vacancy with respect to tightness.
2.1 Workers and Firms
Let E; U, and N denote the expected present values of employment, unemploy-
ment, and non participation. The ￿ ow value functions for an individual worker
5can be written as:
rEi = wi + IWB ￿ ￿(Ei ￿ Ui); (1)
rUi = ￿￿ (si) + si￿(￿)(E ￿ Ui); (2)
rNi = li; (3)
where r is the exogenous discount rate, w is the wage, and ￿ the exogenous
separation rate. ￿ (s) captures the search costs of the unemployed, where
￿s (:);￿ss (:) > 0. The term IWB represents the in-work bene￿t which is
received only when employed. l is the per period real value of leisure if not
participating in the labour force which is assumed to be distributed in the pop-
ulation according to the cumulative distribution function F (l).
The unemployed worker chooses search e⁄ort, si, so as to maximize the
discounted value of unemployment, Ui, taking search e⁄ort by other unemployed
workers, s, as well as other market variables, as given. This yields:
￿si (:) = ￿(￿)(E ￿ Ui): (4)
Thus, the unemployed worker chooses search e⁄ort so as to equalize the marginal
return of search with the marginal cost of search.
The economy consists of a large number of small ￿rms that employ one
worker only. Let J and V denote the expected present values of an occupied
and a vacant job, respectively. The asset equations of a speci￿c occupied job
and a vacant job can be written as:
rJi = y ￿ wi ￿ ￿(Ji ￿ V ); (5)
rV = ￿k + q (￿)(J ￿ V ); (6)
where y is worker productivity and the vacancy cost is denoted by k.
2.2 Wages, search, participation, and employment
Matching frictions create quasi-rents for any matched pair providing a scope for
Nash bargaining.2 In symmetric equilibrium with free entry,i.e. with V = 0,
2The threat point for the worker is given by the value of unemployment. Note that the
value of unemployment is at least as high as the value of non participation for workers in
6the solution satis￿es ￿J = (1 ￿ ￿)(E ￿ U); where ￿ is the worker￿ s bargaining
power. This condition and the ￿ ow value functions in (1)-(6) yield the wage
rule:
w = ￿ (y + ks￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[IWB + ￿ (s)]: (7)
The job creation curve expressing tightness as a function of search is derived
from (5) and (6) and the wage rule in (7). Similarly, search e⁄ort in equilib-
rium, where si = s, is derived conditional on tightness from (4) using the Nash
bargaining solution and (6). This yields:
k(r + ￿)
q (￿)





which determine search e⁄ort and tightness in equilibrium. Clearly, the equilib-
rium wage follows recursively from (7).
A worker enters the labour force into the state of unemployment by choos-
ing to conduct search. It will be worthwhile to enter if the return from entering
exceeds the return from not entering. The value of leisure of the worker who
is indi⁄erent between entering and not entering the labour force, i.e., ^ l , is de-




. Workers with a value of leisure higher than ^ l, i.e.,
li > ^ l, will choose non-participation, whereas workers with a value of leisure
lower than ^ l, i.e., li ￿ ^ l, will choose participation. Combining the condition
for the marginal worker with the ￿ ow equations and the Nash bargaining solu-
tion, the cumulative distribution function for leisure pins down the labour force








In equilibrium, the ￿ ow into unemployment equals the ￿ ow out of unem-
ployment, i.e., ￿(1 ￿ u)LF = s￿(￿)uLF. The equilibrium unemployment rate
the labour force. Thus, employed workers do not consider the option of dropping out of the
labour force as a threat when bargaining over wages.





which depends positively on the separation rate and negatively on tightness and
search intensity. The total number of employed workers is then given by:
Employment = (1 ￿ u)LF: (12)
3 E⁄ects of in-work bene￿ts
This section derives the e⁄ects of in-work bene￿ts on wage formation, search
e⁄ort, unemployment and employment in equilibrium while ignoring the e⁄ects
working through the ￿nancing of the bene￿t. This enables us to pin down the
mechanism through which the in-work bene￿ts works in a clear and transparent
way. Section 5 will deal with the generalization of these results when propor-
tional income or payroll taxation is used to ￿nance the in-work bene￿t. We
summarize the results in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 An in-work bene￿t will reduce wages and increase tightness
and search e⁄ort. Moreover, an in-work bene￿t will reduce the rate of
unemployment and increase labour force participation and employment.
Proof. See appendix.
An in-work bene￿t which, by de￿nition, is conditioned on work, makes it
relatively more attractive to have a job, so it tends to reduce wage demands. As
wage demands fall, it becomes more pro￿table to open vacancies in relation to
the number of e¢ cient job searchers in the unemployment pool, which induces
tightness to increase. As the expected unemployment spells become shorter,
the return to job search increases, which induces unemployed workers to devote
more time to search. The equilibrium rate of unemployment falls both because
unemployed workers search more intensively for a job and because there are more
posted vacancies relative to the number of e¢ cient job searchers. The shorter
expected unemployment spells will also increase the return to participation.
Consequently, total employment increases both because the equilibrium rate
8of unemployment falls and because more workers choose to participate in the
labour market.
The role of job creation becomes even more pronounced if we account for
unemployment bene￿ts in the analysis. Including ￿xed or wage indexed un-
employment bene￿ts in the present model will not modify the results in the
proposition. However, when bene￿ts are indexed to the wage, an increase in the
in-work bene￿ts have a larger e⁄ect on wage demands. This follows as the wage
moderation entails a reduction in unemployment bene￿ts, which further reduces
the wage demands. In fact, the take home pay when employed, w +IWB, may
fall in this case. However, even if labour income falls with an increase in the
in-work bene￿t, search e⁄ort and participation increase. This follows as the
expected unemployment spell becomes shorter. This illustrates a case when
the employment increase caused by an in-work bene￿t is solely driven by job
creation.
4 Fixed wages
In this section we contrast the labour market e⁄ects in the previous section,
when we allowed for wage adjustments, with the labour market outcomes that
would follow in a partial equilibrium framework, i.e. with ￿xed wages. Our
results show that the positive e⁄ects on employment and labour force partici-
pation in equilibrium exceeds that in partial equilibrium if the unemployment
rate is ine¢ ciently high.
To contrast the ￿xed and ￿ exible wage cases is relevant for a number of
reasons. First, our results indicate that partial equilibrium studies that keep
the wage ￿xed tend to underestimate the bene￿cial e⁄ect of introducing in-
work bene￿ts. It is thus important to allow for wage adjustments when deriving
conclusions about the expected employment e⁄ects of in-work bene￿ts. Second,
countries that have run small scale experiments with in-work bene￿ts, in which
case the e⁄ect on the equilibrium wage is limited, can expect larger e⁄ects if the
scheme is introduced more broadly. It may thus be misleading to base policy
recommendations about the desirability of extending such schemes solely on the
empirical evaluation of employment e⁄ects for small scale experiments. Third,
9the analysis sheds some light on the interaction with another important labour
market policy: the minimum wage. In particular, countries with no binding
minimum wages can potentially expect higher positive e⁄ects on employment
than countries with binding minimum wages.
It follows from our model that when wages are ￿xed, an in-work bene￿t will
increases search and labour force participation as the take-home pay increases.
As supply creates its own demand, also employment increases. When wages
are allowed to adjust, we know that wages fall. This is, on the one hand, bad
for employment as the lower wage reduces the incentives to participate and
search for a job, but, on the other hand, it is good for employment as ￿rms
create more jobs. This job creation reduces the expected unemployment spells,
and therefore increases the incentives to participate and search. This exercise
enables us to pin down a condition for when the latter e⁄ect dominates the
former, implying that the positive e⁄ect on employment is larger when wages
are allowed to adjust.
Contrasting the labour market outcomes in the two cases, we can conclude:
Proposition 2 An in-work bene￿t will have a larger positive impact on search
e⁄ort and labour force participation in equilibrium, when wage adjustments
are accounted for, than in partial equilibrium, when wages are assumed to
be ￿xed, if and only if ￿ > ￿ (￿). The condition ￿ ￿ ￿ (￿) is a su¢ cient
condition for an in-work bene￿t to have a larger impact on employment
and unemployment when wages adjust compared to when ￿xed.
Proof. See appendix.
Because of trading externalities, equilibrium search intensity and participa-
tion are too low from the point of view of society when ￿ > ￿(￿). Wages are
simply set too high and tightness too low from a social point of view (Hosios,
1990, and Pissarides, 2000). Under these circumstances, the positive e⁄ect on
search e⁄ort due to the fact that job o⁄ers arrive more frequently will domi-
nate the negative e⁄ect on search e⁄ort due to the fact that lower wages reduce
the payo⁄ from work. This holds also for the participation decision which is
concerned with weighting the e⁄ects on the take-home pay against a higher job
o⁄er arrival rate for the unemployed. As the ￿ exible wage case always brings
10wage moderation and a higher transition rate into employment, ￿ ￿ ￿ (￿) is a
su¢ cient condition for employment to increase and unemployment to fall with
in-work bene￿ts.
5 Financing of the in-work bene￿t
In this section, we study the e⁄ects of in-work bene￿ts when their ￿nancing
through proportional income taxation is taken into account.3 As only employed
workers receive the bene￿ts, the balanced budget condition is:
IWB = tw: (13)
The ￿ ow value function for employment in (1) is now written:
rEi = wi (1 ￿ t) + IWB ￿ ￿(Ei ￿ Ui); (14)
while (2), (3), (5), and (6) remain unchanged. To derive the equilibrium equa-
tions determining tightness, search and the wage we follow the same procedure
as in the basic setting although now accounting for that IWB = tw according
to the balanced budget in (13). This yields the following equations:
w =
￿ (1 ￿ t)
1 ￿ ￿t









[y + ￿ (s)] ￿
￿ (1 ￿ t)
1 ￿ ￿t
ks￿; (16)




which correspond to equations (7), (8) and (9) in the basic setting. From these
equilibrium equations, it is straightforward to show that an increase in the pro-
portional tax rate used to ￿nance in-work bene￿ts reduces wages and increases
tightness, i.e., @w
@t < 0; @￿







as long as the economy is on the side of the "La⁄er curve" where an increase in
the tax rate increases total revenues. The government budget constraint in (13)
3The IWB being ￿nanced by payroll taxation would yield the same results.
11show that the relationship between the tax rate and the in-work, however, may
not be monotonic. There is a direct positive e⁄ect of an increased tax rate, t,
on government revenues, but there is also a negative e⁄ect on revenues as the
tax base is eroded through wage moderation.





￿ ￿ > 0: (18)




1￿￿ ￿ ￿ (s)
￿
.
From the basic setting, in-work bene￿ts unambiguously improved search and
labour force participation as the shorter expected unemployment spells made
it more attractive to look for a job. However, when the IWB is ￿nanced with
taxation, there is a counteracting e⁄ect because taxation directly reduces the
payo⁄ from work. This counteracting e⁄ect is captured by the second term on
the left hand side in (18), while the ￿rst term captures improved incentives to
search and participate due to that it has become easier to get a job. A rewriting
of the condition in (18) gives:
1 ￿ t
1 ￿ ￿t
￿ > ￿ (￿): (19)
As will be shown below, the condition in (19) holds when tightness is below its
socially e¢ cient level. The condition in (19) is, however, only a su¢ cient, not a
necessary, condition for unemployment to fall and employment to increase with
tax ￿nanced in-work bene￿ts.4 We can conclude the following:
Proposition 3 Proposition 1 holds also when in-work bene￿ts are ￿nanced
through proportional taxes on wages, provided a higher tax rate implies higher
￿scal revenues and that 1￿t
1￿￿t￿ > ￿ (￿).
Proof. See appendix.
It is straightforward to show that tightness is at its socially e¢ cient level
when 1￿t
1￿￿t￿ = ￿ (￿). This condition should be compared to the standard Hosios
4Unemployment and employment is still given by (11) and (12), respectively. Unemploy-
ment will certainly fall with t if search intensity increases with t. Employment increases with
certainty when t increases if labour force participation increases and unemployment falls.
12condition, ￿ = ￿ (￿), which is needed in order to reach social e¢ ciency when
there is no tax ￿nanced in-work bene￿t available in the economy (Hosios, 1990,
Pissarides, 2000). To do this notice that equilibrium tightness and search when
in-work bene￿ts are ￿nanced through proportional taxation are given by equa-
tions (16) and (17), while the wage is given by equation (15). Exactly the same






and IWB = 0 into the equations (8), (9), and (7) which then characterize the
equilibrium with no IWB. This means that the equilibrium of a model with in-
work bene￿ts ￿nanced through a proportional tax on wages t and with workers￿
bargaining power ￿ is isomorphic to the equilibrium of a model without in-work
bene￿ts and with workers￿bargaining power ￿
0 < ￿. Thus, an increase in the
tax rate used to ￿nance in-work bene￿ts is equivalent to reducing the "e⁄ective"
bargaining power of the worker. This suggests that tax ￿nanced in-work bene￿ts
provides the government with an instrument to reduce the worker￿ s "e⁄ective"
bargaining power, and thereby enables policy makers to improve e¢ ciency in
the economy when ￿ > ￿ (￿). Under these circumstances a marginal increase
in taxation moves the labour market toward e¢ ciency, thus increasing search
intensity and participation and reducing unemployment. We can conclude the
following:
Proposition 4 The government can use tax ￿nanced in-work bene￿ts to reduce
worker￿ s e⁄ective bargaining power and thereby improve e¢ ciency. The tax rate,




For the case of a Cobb-Douglas matching function, the socially e¢ cient tax
rate is given by t =
￿￿￿
￿(1￿￿), as ￿ then is constant. The IWB inducing constrained
e¢ ciency is IWB =
￿￿￿(￿)
￿(1￿￿(￿))w(￿); where the wage is the equilibrium wage
outcome from (15) when tightness is at its socially e¢ cient level.
Next we turn to some numerical simulations in order to determine under
which conditions expression (19) holds and to provide examples of the magnitude
13of the e⁄ects of IWB on labour market performance.
6 Numerical simulations
First we determine for which range of marginal tax rates the e¢ ciency condition
in (19) holds, given the value of ￿ and ￿. As ￿ 2 [0;1], for t to belong to the
interval [0;1], we need that ￿ > ￿ (￿). The values for ￿ used in the literature
vary widely. For instance, Hall (2005) uses 0:24, while Shimer (2005) uses 0:72.5
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) in their literature survey consider [0:5;0:7] to
be the range of plausible values. There are not many estimates of ￿. The
conventional value of ￿ used in the literature is 0:5, although Flinn (2006)
provides a point estimate of 0:4.
Given the uncertainty surrounding the value of these parameters, we calcu-
lated the highest tax rate under which expression (19) is satis￿ed for the whole
range of admissible values of ￿ and ￿ (see Figure 1). As far as the workers￿
bargaining power is higher than the level achieving social e¢ ciency, and thus
it makes sense to use in-work bene￿ts from a social planner perspective, the
condition under which the labour market improves when ￿nancing is taken into
account is satis￿ed for a wide range of marginal tax rates. For example, when
￿ = 0:6 and ￿ = 0:4, an increase in fully-￿nanced bene￿ts moves the economy
towards e¢ ciency as far as t < 0:56. When ￿ = 0:4 and ￿ = 0:3, this is the case
for t < 0:36. Thus, there is room for in-work bene￿ts to play an important role
in improving labour market outcomes.
Another way to assess the potential role of bene￿ts is to quantify what their
optimal level is. At the end of the previous section, it has been shown how to
derive the IWB inducing constrained e¢ ciency. For the purpose of comparing
the optimal level to observed levels in existing programmes, it is more useful
to look at the level of bene￿ts as a percentage of the wage. Given (13), this is
equivalent to t and thus can be read in Figure 1 for each value of ￿ and ￿, as
the highest tax rate under which expression (19) is satis￿ed is the one inducing
e¢ ciency. Thus, for ￿ = 0:4 and ￿ = 0:3, the optimal in-work bene￿t would
be 36% of the wage. By comparison, the credit rate in the phase-in area of the
5See Gertler and Trigari (2009) for a review of values used in other studies.
14EITC, and thus the ratio between the in-work bene￿t and the wage for incomes
within the phase-in area, is 7:65% in case of no children, 34% with one child,
and 40% and 45% respectively with two and three children.
Given the simplicity of the model and the uncertainty surrounding the value
of the main parameters, these calculations are only indicative. Nonetheless, they
suggest that bene￿ts of a substantial size, but not far o⁄ from observed levels,
may be needed to correct labour market ine¢ ciencies due to search externalities.
In the rest of this section we calibrate the model to gauge insights about the
quantitative impact of in-work bene￿ts on the main labour market variables.
First, we compare the impact of bene￿ts with and without wage adjustment
when ￿nancing is not accounted for. Then, we look at the model with ￿nancing.
6.1 Calibration
To calibrate the model, we assume a Cobb-Douglas matching function:
X = h(v;su) = mv1￿￿ (su)
￿ where m > 0;￿ 2 (0;1). (20)
The convex search cost function is assumed to be a power function and therefore
￿ (s) = s￿, where ￿ > 1. (21)
The month is the basic time unit. Productivity y is normalized to 1. Worker
bargaining power ￿ is set to the standard value in the literature of 0.5, while the
real interest rate r is 0.005. Following Christensen et al. (2005), parameter ￿
equals 2, implying a quadratic search cost.6 ￿ equals 0.4, while parameters k; ￿;
and m are set to replicate an unemployment rate of 0:06, an average duration
of unemployment of three months, and an average duration of a vacancy of
one month in the absence of in-work bene￿ts, giving k = 4:5616, ￿ = 0:0213,
and m = 0:6807. Finally, we assume the per period value of leisure to be
distributed according to an exponential function with parameter ￿, calibrated
6Christensen et al. (2005) structurally estimate a model with on-the-job search using
Danish microdata. A quadratic function is also the preferred speci￿cation in Yashiv (2000),
who structurally estimates a model with search only by the unemployed using Israeli aggregate
time-series data.
15so that the participation rate without in-work bene￿ts equals 0:7. The table
below summarizes the parametrization.
y ￿ k r ￿ m ￿ ￿ ￿
1 0.5 4:5616 0.005 0:0213 0:6807 0.4 2 0.631
6.2 Numerical results with ￿ exible and ￿xed wages
The theory predicts stronger e⁄ects on labour market performance of in-work
bene￿ts when wages adjust in comparison to when wages are ￿xed, in the case
when unemployment is ine¢ ciently high. This section investigates the magni-
tude of these di⁄erences.
The simulation results show that the quantitative impact on unemployment
and employment is signi￿cantly stronger when the e⁄ect of bene￿ts on wages is
taken into account. Figure 2 describes the e⁄ects on the main labour market
variables of introducing in-work bene￿ts up to the equivalent of half of labour
productivity. The continuous line represents the case where wages are ￿ exible,
while the dotted line represents the case with ￿xed wages. Compared to an
unemployment rate of 6% without in-work bene￿ts, the introduction of bene￿ts
equivalent to 40% of productivity implies a decline in unemployment to 4.97%
when wages are ￿xed and to 4.41% when they are ￿ exible, while employment
increases by an additional 0.62% with ￿ exible wages as compared to the case
with ￿xed ones (see Table 1).
These results suggest that the extension of bene￿ts to larger portions of the
workforce does not entail, in itself, a decline in their e⁄ectiveness or, worse, a
reversal of their e⁄ect. In the next section we look at another issue that needs
to be taken into account when the scope of bene￿t programmes is increased to
comprise a non negligible share of the workforce: their ￿nancing.
6.3 Numerical results with ￿nancing
Here we use the same parametrization as in the previous section to compare
the e⁄ects on labour market performance of fully-￿nanced bene￿ts up to the
16equivalent of half of labour productivity.7 Adjustable wages and ￿xed wages
are considered in turn.
In Figure 3, the continuous line represents the ￿ exible wage case, while the
dotted line represents the case with ￿xed wages. When bene￿ts are fully ￿nanced
by taxing bene￿ciaries and wages are downward rigid, in-work bene￿ts do not
have any e⁄ect. When wages can adjust, tightness increases and gross wage
decreases. Notice that in this setting, gross wage is equivalent to total income,
as ￿scal revenues are entirely used to ￿nance bene￿ts. The comparison of ￿gures
2 and 3 reveals that both tightness and wages respond more strongly when
bene￿ts are ￿nanced through taxation on bene￿ciaries￿wages as compared to
the case when an identical amount of in-work bene￿ts is ￿nanced through other
sources. This is due to the additional wage moderation stemming from taxation.
On the other hand, for a given amount of bene￿ts, search intensity, labour
force participation, and employment responds much less with proportional taxes
on wages than without. For unemployment the response in the two cases is
similar. As predicted by the theory, with full ￿nancing the response of search
intensity and labour force participation is hump-shaped, initially increasing with
the level of bene￿ts (and taxes) and then declining. The tax rate at which both
quantities reach their peak is t = 1=3, corresponding to IWB ￿ 0:28, at which
(constrained) e¢ ciency is achieved. Further increases in fully ￿nanced bene￿ts
take the labour market away from e¢ ciency. However, search intensity and
participation stay above the level they have when no bene￿ts are paid until
IWB ￿ 0:47 (t ￿ 56%). Unemployment declines in the whole range, falling, for
instance, from 6% to 4.15% when bene￿ts are equivalent to 40% of productivity.
Total employment increases, reaching approximately 67.2% of the population
when IWB = 0:4, as compared to 65.8% with no bene￿ts (see Table 1).
7The tax rate corresponding to IWB = 0:5 is approximately 60%. Given this parametriza-
tion, the maximum attainable amount of bene￿ts with wage ￿exibility is 0.64, achieved at a
tax rate of 88%.
177 Conclusions
In-work bene￿ts are becoming increasingly popular among policy-makers due
to their success in the American and British contexts. Whether this success can
be extended to larger sections of the workforce and to other countries is an open
issue. This paper represents a ￿rst step towards addressing this question.
We analyze the impact of in-work bene￿ts on some of the main labour mar-
ket indicators in a search framework, taking into account the e⁄ects on labour
market equilibrium. We ￿nd that in-work bene￿ts increase labour force partic-
ipation, employment, and search intensity by the unemployed, while wages and
the unemployment rate decline.
Moreover, we show that the positive e⁄ect on employment and labour force
participation in equilibrium exceeds that in partial equilibrium, i.e., when wage
are ￿xed, if the unemployment rate is ine¢ ciently high. Results from numerical
simulations suggest that the quantitative impact on unemployment and employ-
ment is signi￿cantly larger when the e⁄ect of bene￿ts on wages is taken into
account.
The results derived from contrasting the ￿xed and ￿ exible wage cases have
important policy implications. If in-work bene￿ts are introduced as small scale
experiments, in which case the e⁄ect on the equilibrium wage is indeed limited,
then the evaluation of their impact on labour market outcomes will tend to
underestimate the bene￿cial e⁄ect of introducing in-work bene￿ts more broadly.
Indeed, countries that have run small scale experiments with in-work bene￿ts
can expect larger e⁄ects if the scheme is extended. Also, the analysis sheds some
light on the interaction of in-work bene￿ts and a minimum wage. Countries
with no binding minimum wages can potentially expect higher positive e⁄ects
on employment than countries with binding minimum wages.
Finally we did derive the socially optimal amount of in-work bene￿ts. It
turns out that the government can use tax ￿nanced in-work bene￿ts to reduce
worker￿ s e⁄ective bargaining power and thereby reduce ine¢ ciencies induced by
search externalities. Numerical simulations suggest that bene￿ts of a substantial
size, although not far o⁄from observed levels, may be needed in order to correct
labour market ine¢ ciencies due to search externalities.
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7.1 Appendix: Proofs of Propositions









￿ > 0: To get the equilibrium e⁄ect on tightness,
we need to account for the fact that s is a function of ￿ through (9). However,
as search is optimally determined by workers, the e⁄ects working through search
e⁄ort in (8) will have no impact on tightness. Using how IWB a⁄ects tightness
and the fact that search is optimally determined, we can show the following
21for search e⁄ort, wage, income from work, labour force participation, the un-





@IWB > 0 from (9),
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+1 > 0, @LF













@IWB < 0 from (11), and
@Employment
@IWB = ￿ @u
@IWBLF + (1 ￿ u) @LF
@IWB > 0 from (12).
Proposition 2. With wages ￿xed at the pre-bene￿t level ~ w, tightness is de-
rived from (5) and (6) and given by: k(r + ￿)=q (￿) = y￿ ~ w. Combining (1) and
(2), we obtain E ￿U = ( ~ w + IWB + ￿ (s))=(r + ￿ + s￿(￿)), which used in (4)
gives search e⁄ort given by: ￿s (:) = ￿(￿)( ~ w + IWB + ￿ (s))=(r + ￿ + s￿(￿)).












@IWB￿s (:)(r + ￿).
The ￿rst term captures the direct e⁄ect (and only e⁄ect if wages are ￿xed)
and the second term captures the e⁄ects due to ￿ exible wages. As the ￿rst
term is the same in the ￿xed and ￿ exible case, the e⁄ect on search due to
wage adjustments depends on the sign of the second term. Using the expres-
sions in the proof of proposition 1 and the fact that ￿(￿) = q￿ and
@￿(￿)
@￿ =
q0￿ + q, we have A =
(r+￿)
(s￿+(r+￿)￿(￿)=￿(￿)) [￿ ￿ ￿] > 0 $ ￿ > ￿. Labour force is




r+￿+s￿(￿) ￿ ￿ (s)
￿
, which can be rewritten using
the expression for search as: LF = F (s￿s (s) ￿ ￿ (s)). Di⁄erentiation yields
@LF
@IWB = F0 (:)s￿ss (s) @s
@IWB . Therefore, the condition for labour force partic-
ipation to increase more with a marginal increase in IWB under ￿ exible wages
is the same as the one for search intensity. The expressions for unemploy-













: Thus the unemploy-
ment rate tends to fall by more when wages are ￿ exible as the higher tightness
increases the transition rate into employment irrespective of whether ￿ is larger
or smaller than ￿. However, if ￿ > ￿ (￿), search increases by more if wages are
￿ exible, and thus we have an additional negative e⁄ect on the unemployment
rate, making ￿ > ￿ (￿) a su¢ cient but not necessary condition for unemployment
to decline more when wages are ￿ exible. This is also the case for employment,
as
@Employment
@IWB = ￿ @u
@IWB + (1 ￿ u) @LF
@IWB.
22Proposition 3. Di⁄erentiating (16) with respect to t and ￿ yields d￿
dt =
(1￿￿)[y+ks￿+￿(s)]





(1￿t)s￿ > 0. Note that changes in t
working through s can be ignored as s is optimally chosen by the individuals.






(1 ￿ t) d￿
dt ￿ ￿
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1￿￿ ￿ ￿ (s)
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wrt LF and t yields dLF




(1 ￿ t) d￿
dt ￿ ￿
￿
, where we again note
that changes in t working through s can be ignored as s is optimally chosen by
the individuals. Substitute the expression of d￿
dt derived in this proof into (18)
and use (16) one gets that search and LF increases with t if 1￿t
1￿￿t￿ > ￿ (￿).
Di⁄erentiating (11) yields that unemployment tends to fall with t as tight-
ness always increases with t. As more search also reduces unemployment, the
e⁄ect on unemployment of higher taxes is reinforced if 1￿t
1￿￿t￿ > ￿ (￿), and
dampened, or possibly more than counteracted, when 1￿t
1￿￿t￿ < ￿ (￿). Di⁄er-
entiating (12) yields that employment increases with t if u falls with t and
or LF increases with t. Thus 1￿t
1￿￿t￿ > ￿ (￿) is a su¢ cient, but not nec-
essary condition for u to fall and employment to increase with t. The re-
sults of the ￿rst proposition thus holds if 1￿t
1￿￿t￿ > ￿ (￿), and if it is the
case that a higher IWB is ￿nanced with a higher tax rate rather than a

















2]. The second term is always positive as d￿
dt > 0. So,
for ￿ (s) small enough and t not too high dIWB
dt > 0. Substituting the expression
for d￿













that at t = 0, @IWB
@t = w > 0.
Proposition 4. The social welfare function is SW = (1 ￿ u)LFrE +
uLFrU +
R l max
^ l ldl+(1￿u)LFrJ +vrV . Rewritten using the ￿ ow value func-
tions in equilibrium ((14), (2), (5), (6)) as well as the ￿ ow equilibrium condition,
i.e., ￿(1 ￿ u)LF = q (￿)v = s￿(￿)uLF, and the budget constraint in (13) we
have SW = ￿LFu￿ (s)+
R l max
^ l lidli+(1￿u)LFy￿s￿uLFk when r approaches
zero. The tax rate will in￿ uence social welfare through its impact on tightness,
unemployment, search, labour force, and leisure consumption of the marginal
worker. The total derivative of SW wrt t is given by:
23dSW
dt

























dt = d^ l
dt = 0 if t =
￿￿￿
￿(1￿￿) (see the proof of the previous
proposition). Thus if t =
￿￿￿
￿(1￿￿) only the last term on the right hand side
of dSW
dt remains, where we know that d￿
dt > 0. A closer examination reveals
that the last bracket on the right hand side is zero only when ￿ (￿) = 1￿t
1￿￿t￿
which holds only when t =
￿￿￿
￿(1￿￿). This last bracket on the right hand side
captures namely the e⁄ects derived in Pissarides (2000) working through the
direct e⁄ect of tightness on vacancy costs and the impact of tightness working
through unemployment given search e⁄ort, i.e., @u
@￿. By allowing for tax ￿nanced
in-work bene￿ts, the government now has an instrument to reach constrained
e¢ ciency when ￿ > ￿ (￿).
247.2 Appendix 2: Figures and Tables
Table 1: Main labour market variables
t ￿ s w LF u e
IWB=0 0.382 0.872 0.880 70.0% 6.00% 65.8%
IWB=0.2
No ￿nancing Fixed wage 0.382 0.973 0.880 77.7% 5.41% 73.5%
Flexible wage 0.427 0.974 0.875 77.8% 5.07% 73.8%
Full ￿nancing Flexible wage 23.1% 0.498 0.874 0.867 70.2% 5.15% 66.6%
IWB=0.4
No ￿nancing Fixed wage 0.382 1.065 0.880 83.4% 4.97% 79.3%
Flexible wage 0.468 1.068 0.870 83.6% 4.41% 79.9%
Full ￿nancing Flexible wage 47.3% 0.727 0.874 0.845 70.1% 4.15% 67.2%
The case with full ￿nancing and ￿xed wage is equivalent to IWB = 0:


















26Figure 2: Main Indicators Without Financing

































27Figure 3: Main Indicators With Financing
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